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Executive Summary 
• There are several key technical risks to the UK’s 5G and wider mobile network infrastructure. 
Principally, these cover espionage, sabotage, and blackmail1. The Committee should ensure 
they do not overlook the “sabotage” angle – being able to disable the UK’s mobile networks 
would have devastating impact on the economy, public safety, and wider society. 
• This discussion needs to be about more than purely 5G networks however – the committee 
needs to focus on existing 4G networks as well – 4G and 5G networks are deeply intertwined, 
and for each site, mobile operators need to deploy 5G from the same vendor as they use on that 
site for 4G. This plays into the economic arguments made by operators against a ban on Huawei 
– there is significant deliberate “vendor lock-in”, meaning mobile operators did not face a 
genuine competitive choice between providers – those who had adopted Huawei 4G systems 
would need to remove and replace those existing 4G systems. Further significant use of Huawei 
risks further entrenching their equipment, making it even more costly to remove in future. 
• The interdependency between networks also means that the option of switching back to a 4G 
does not exist should problems arise with the 5G network. Should any capability remain, it is 
likely to be only a very limited 2G service with practically no data service provision.  
• The Government’s own advice from HCSEC around very limited assurance of Huawei equipment 
appears to significantly contradict the assurances Government appears to have, and the 
Committee should explore this area further as a matter of priority (details enclosed). 
• The UK’s decision could well affect the UK’s geopolitical position. The UK’s soft power on an 
international stage may be diminished by the decision, particularly since much of its soft power 
is derived from a dedication to democracy, human rights, and civil liberties. 
 
1 https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/31/boris-johnson-britain-knows-its-selling-out-its-national-security-to-
huawei/ 
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• The UK’s international standing, particularly with the US, could be impacted by as few as 3 or 4 
individual senators, regardless of the quality of relations with the White House2. The wider 
impact of the political sentiment of decisions should therefore be considered. 
• From an international prestige and status perspective, even some minor sabotage (i.e. short-
term deliberate outage of a UK mobile network) could make the UK look significantly weakened 
on an international stage, and harm the country’s reputation as a reliable place to do business. 
• Given the Chinese state’s past behaviour on offensive cyber action, and Huawei’s apparently 
close links to the Chinese state, there is an elevated potential cyber threat presented. 
• From an international relations and diplomacy perspective, a dependency on another state for 
critical infrastructure is a weakness which can be exploited by others. 
 
2 https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/washington-is-furious-at-boris-s-huawei-bid 
   
  SFG0019 
   
 
What are the risks to the UK’s 5G infrastructure? How can these be mitigated? 
 
There are 3 main risks to the UK’s 5G infrastructure in the context of this consultation: 
1. The loss of availability (i.e. taking down) of one or more mobile network, causing knock-on 
impact to the country and wider economy due to the inability of people to communicate. 
2. The inability to source "end-to-end trustworthy” components to build our 5G infrastructure for 
a secure and resilient future. 
3. A targeted attack carried out to compromise the confidentiality or integrity of messages 
travelling over the UK’s 5G networks (which could exist undetected). 
 
From an international relations perspective, granting the UK’s 5G contracts to Huawei creates a 
potential cyber espionage threat (through backdoors and other design weaknesses in hardware and 
software) and cyber warfare threat (through control of mobile network infrastructure) to the UK’s 
economic and national security. These concerns arise because of the company’s alleged close ties to the 
Chinese government and China’s strong track record of state-sponsored cyber operations against rival 
countries. 
There is documented evidence to suggest that Huawei has very close connections to the Chinese 
government: 
• “Tens of billions of dollars”3 in subsidies from the Chinese government helps to explain the 
company’s rapid growth to become a leading supplier of telecoms equipment which has allowed 
Huawei to undercut competitors like Ericsson or Nokia. 
• A study of CVs show Huawei employees working simultaneously for Chinese military 
establishments.4 
• China’s 2017 National Intelligence law obliges Chinese companies to assist the state’s 
intelligence gathering efforts, although Huawei refutes this.5 
 
The risk is that Huawei could be required to serve the Chinese state in its cyber espionage operations, 
which China has previously demonstrated a clear willingness and a capability to engage. Cyber 
espionage is the most common type of state sponsored cyber operations6, and academic research shows 
that out of a total 266 publicly known cyber incidents between rival states from 2000 to 2015, 74 (28%) 
were initiated by China7. According to another database, 140 out of 390 (36%) cyber incidents since 
2005 were conducted or sponsored by the Chinese government8. 
 
 
3 Chuin-Wei Yap. “State Support Helped Fuel Huawei’s Global Rise”. 25 Dec 2019. Wall Street Journal. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736 
4 Kathrin Hille. “Huawei CVs show close links with military, study says”. 7 July 2019. Financial Times. 
https://www.ft.com/content/b37f0a9e-a07f-11e9-a282-2df48f366f7d 
5 Yuan Yang. “Is Huawei compelled by Chinese law to help with espionage?”. 5 March 2019. Financial Times. 
https://www.ft.com/content/282f8ca0-3be6-11e9-b72b-2c7f526ca5d0 
6 Thomas Rid. 2012. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol. 35 (1): 5 -32.  
7 Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C Maness. 2015. Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International 
System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
8 “Cyber Operations Tracker”, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations. 
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A more serious, yet less likely in the short term, threat is China’s use of cyber capabilities against a rival 
during heightened tensions or conflict, though this is unlikely in the short-term. Given society’s growing 
dependence on computer networks, critical infrastructure and services are vulnerable to computer 
network attack and sabotage.  
Rather than a standalone tactic (given their effects are quickly reversible9), cyber warfare capabilities 
will likely be employed in any future conflict to disrupt critical services and act as a force multiplier. If 
Huawei controls the UK’s 5G mobile network, it could theoretically be deliberately shut off in the run-up 
to, or during, times of conflict. This could cause widespread disruption given 5G’s future importance to 
the internet of things and thus the functioning of society. 
A far less drastic, but nonetheless serious, use of such capabilities would be to limit the capabilities of 
the communications networks at key times. Such a tactic would make the UK a less attractive place to 
do business, and could give a rival a short term advantage. 
This problem is not unique to mobile or 5G however, and is relevant to any scenario where digitally-
connected critical infrastructure sits under the control of a third-country entity. Clearly much critical 
infrastructure is inherently not connected to the internet, although with 5G networks this is effectively 
unavoidable. Where high-risk vendors with state links could be in a position to have the ability to carry 
out “power projection” against UK infrastructure, this should be a clear concern for the Committee. 
 
9 Eric Gartzke. 2013. The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth. International 
Security. Vol. 38(2): 41-73. 
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What is the role of government in 5G cyber security? 
Government’s role in 5G cyber-security is absolutely critical. The DCMS Telecoms Supply Chain Review 
report (2019) recognised that Government involvement in cyber-security is essential, as a purely 
market-driven approach absent close scrutiny does not incentivise investment in security – 
commercial operators assume that Government will provide an infinite backstop to defend the nation, 
and therefore they do not have to bear the cost of this. Not all of the impact of a cyber attack against 
our telecoms infrastructure would be financial however, and at a time of Covid-19, Government clearly 
does not wish to be writing blank cheques to enable industry to haphazardly ignore cyber-security in 
pursuit of the lowest possible prices of equipment, over all other factors. 
Our network operators are profitable businesses, and it is only right that they should bear the cost of 
making what they provide secure – were we to be talking about “safety”, it would be near 
unconscionable to suggest that a supplier of a service to every member of the general public would not 
be responsible for safety. 
Cyber-security is a logical extension of the notion of safety – in the same way it is possible to cut costs 
on building a house by working in a dangerous way, it is possible to cut costs in the design, build and 
operations of a mobile network by minimising the expenditure on cyber-security, or by outsourcing key 
aspects of the network, putting them outside of the control of staff of the Mobile Network Operator 
(MNO). It is also possible to cut costs in a mobile network by purchasing from a supplier which offers 
significantly lower prices, albeit while providing lower levels of technical assurance as to their security. 
The role of Government is to scrutinise the capability, competence, and efficacy of their security 
measures, and ensure that sufficient security measures are in place to protect the UK’s strategic 
national interests, so the public have confidence that the networks will be there when they need them 
the most. The role also includes ensuring that, from a strategic perspective, suitable constraints or 
regulations are in place to prevent the “cheapest always wins” approach – absent external input, 
generally the cheapest priced solution will be used, to maximise profits. If this is not the intention of 
Government (as appears to be the case from recent statements in both Houses), the role of Government 
is to clarify this clearly to operators and use legislative measures if insufficient powers are available. 
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To what degree is it possible to exclude Huawei technology from the most sensitive parts 
of the UK’s 5G network while allowing it to supply peripheral components? 
This question is a regularly recurring one, and we refer the Committee to a previous response to the 
Joint Committee on National Security here on this topic, which was dissolved due to the new 
Parliamentary session before the inquiry completed.10 
Equipment in mobile networks is inherently inter-connected. One of the challenges previously identified 
is that 5G networks contain more functionality at the “edge” of the network, in order to deliver 
reduced connection latency. This means that some functions which would traditionally be viewed as 
part of the “core” may end up at the edge of the network, integrated with equipment from high-risk 
vendors. This means that it is very hard to exclude any one vendor from supplying radio equipment to 
the network, while preventing them from meaningfully interacting with the core network (noting that in 
a mobile network, the radios inherently communicate directly with the core network). 
A broader question to be asked here is the extent to which this distinction makes sense, and the impact 
that the decision may have. For some of the high-profile use-cases of 5G networks, such as Industrial IoT 
and Connected/Autonomous Vehicles, there may be safety critical aspects of the system, located at the 
network edge. These would be provided by the peripheral components, which could be from high risk 
vendors, absent clarification from Government that this will never be acceptable. Alternatively, the 
impact of an outage on the overall system itself may be such that it is critical, by virtue of the 
consequences of it failing. For this reason, the distinction around peripheral and non-peripheral 
components is not as clear-cut as the legislation suggests.  
In line with NCSC’s advice, high risk vendors should not be used to provide systems which are used for 
safety-critical applications, or for critical national infrastructure. A decision to permit active radio 
elements of the mobile network would preclude a network from being used for safety-critical or CNI 
purposes. Given the potential future uses of 5G, this would seem to hold the UK back. Operators are 
likely to deploy the lowest cost radios, to maximise profits, since they are not in the business of 
spending money they do not have to. 
It is important to also note that Government advice states operators should not use equipment from 
high risk vendors at special protected sites. Given how mobile operators design and deploy their 
network in “zones”, with each zone using interoperable equipment from the same vendor, there are 
clear practical challenges. If the only constraint placed on operators is around the geographic positioning 
of high risk vendor equipment in relation to the sensitive site, the Committee should consider the 
impact of all access routes to this sensitive site involving passing through areas of radio equipment 
from high risk vendors. The measures in place to prevent high risk equipment from interacting or 
communicating with low risk vendor equipment should also be explored further by the Committee – 
networks are inherently designed to facilitate communication between components, and both 4G and 
5G networks feature direct, base station to base station communications to enable handovers as users 
move between base stations. It does not appear that current guidance addresses this major issue. 
 
10 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/national-security-
strategy-committee/ensuring-access-to-safe-technology-the-uks-5g-infrastructure-and-national-
security/written/105444.html  
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What credible alternatives are available to Huawei systems? 
For radio network equipment itself, there are only 3 widely available vendors – Nokia, Ericsson and 
Huawei. There are other vendors with much more limited market share, which have little or no footprint 
in the UK and Europe – these include Samsung, for example, though they are significant in end-user 
devices like handsets. 
There are alternatives to these traditional Tier-1 suppliers, however, which present completely 
independent supply chain options. The UK mobile network operators have historically not considered 
these, and prefer to favour the traditional Tier-1 vendors. These options should be prioritised by 
Government as options to diversify the supply chain, as well as introduce opportunities for export to 
our allies. 
Members of the Committee should note that the 5G RuralFirst project (based in the Orkney Islands) 
successfully demonstrated that new, innovative equipment can be used to build mobile networks in 
some of the most challenging environments possible, and that these work with existing handsets and 
equipment. Therefore, to some extent, the problem is commercial, rather than technical. No equipment 
from high-risk vendors (or indeed any Tier-1 vendors) was used for the radio network in that project. 
This proves that there are alternative approaches that can be utilised to build secure mobile networks 
without relying on the existing limited supply chains. 
One challenge the UK (and other countries) face is that mobile operators like to build their network in 
large zones and utilise the same vendor's radio equipment throughout that zone. This is to facilitate 
the planning and operation of their network in that zone – despite these mobile networks being 
standardised, radios from competing vendors are not interoperable in a “plug-and-play" manner. This 
raises the cost of switching radio vendor significantly, and results in a very high barrier to entry for 
innovative players in this space. In 5G RuralFirst, for example, we were able to build a green-field 
network without having to work around the constraints of an existing “Tier 1” vendor’s network 
management software. Commercial operators are held back by the lack of inter-vendor interoperability 
in network standards, and this is an area the UK should aim to take leadership of, in the global 
standards arena, via the existing DCMS Testbed & Trials funded programs. 
There is a challenge around commercial incentives here for the committee to consider – a mobile 
operator clearly wants to build the lowest cost solution, in order to maximise the potential profit which 
can be made from the system. 
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To what extent was the UK Government’s decision on Huawei driven by political rather 
than technical factors? 
The UK Government’s decision was largely foreseeable in advance, and driven by both commercial and 
political factors. The UK’s mobile operators exerted significant lobbying influence over Government 
during the process – to some extent, the Government’s decision came too late for an outright restriction 
to be issued. Operators had been rolling out 5G in earnest for many months prior to this ruling coming 
through, having sought clarity and received little beyond a confirmation that the existing guidance (that 
high-risk vendors could be used in the network, albeit not in the core of the network) would be revised. 
Thorsten Benner, director of the Global Public Policy Institute, believes the decision is political due to 
fear of retaliation, citing the Chinese ambassador stating in an interview that exclusion would lead to 
worsening economic and political relations. He believes that Chinese threats to the UK over economic 
and political relations worsening were seen as more salient to the UK than US threats.11 The US was also 
reported to have provided clear “intelligence information” at the end of 2019, showing “that Huawei 
cooperates with China’s security authorities”12. While this is likely true for many businesses around the 
world, it is important for the committee to remember that this discussion pertains to the UK’s own 
critical national infrastructure.  
This perhaps becomes clearer when considering that accepting high risk vendors in the 5G network 
would hinder moving towards OpenRAN and other interoperability-driven initiatives, which aim to 
avoid the lock-in scenario the UK is currently in, with edge 4G and 5G radio equipment needing to be 
from the same vendor. Failing to move towards interoperable systems would increase market barriers 
to entry by existing or new rivals in the future, further entrenching the problem and increasing the cost 
of moving to other providers13. 
From a public opinion perspective, the Government lacks public pressure against the decision due to 
lack of knowledge about the issue. According to a YouGov survey from April 2019, 34% of British adults 
opposed the decision to give the 5G contract to Huawei, while only 22% supported it. However, 44% 
responded ‘don’t know’, suggesting a lack of understanding of, and therefore engagement with, this 
issue by the public.14 
Unlike the US and Australia, much of the UK’s telecommunications infrastructure, including 4G, is 
provided by Huawei already. An outright ban would mean the UK’s mobile networks would need to 
invest in removing existing 4G Huawei technology, which would be economically and politically costly by 
delaying the government’s pledges of 5G rollout.15 BT have already announced that replacing existing 
Huawei infrastructure in order to meet the government’s 35% cap policy will cost them £500m over five 
 
11 https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/31/boris-johnson-britain-knows-its-selling-out-its-national-security-to-
huawei/  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 YouGov. “Do you support the decision to let Huawei help build the UK 5G network? Plus, converting offices into 
housing, and the role of the Bank of England results”. 24 April 2019. 
https://yougov.co.uk/opi/surveys/results#/survey/00a12913-6671-11e9-9042-bd2e3c2704ca  
15 Emily Taylor, “Who’s Afraid of Huawei? Understanding the 5G Security Concerns”. Chatham House. 9 September 
2019. https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/who-s-afraid-huawei-understanding-5g-security-
concerns# 
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years.16 It is worth noting that EE is the network operator responsible for delivery of the UK’s 
Emergency Services Network, and the recent announcement of a 2-year delay to the removal of Huawei 
equipment from BT’s core network17. This would suggest that the UK’s long-delayed ESN project will 
continue to incorporate a Huawei core until 2023 at the earliest. 
These timescales are also useful, as they demonstrate to the Committee the very real difficulty in 
reversing this decision going forwards – BT made the decision to remove Huawei equipment from its 
network core in 2018, and said that would be completed by 2020. Due to the requirement to also 
reduce Huawei’s presence in the radio access network to 35%, BT now says this original task will take 
until 2023. The level of technical confidence that Government feels it has over the integrity and security 
of the providers of its critical infrastructure must therefore take into account the timelines that would 
be involved in removal and replacement to reverse this decision, were this to prove incorrect. The 
vendor of edge equipment on the UK’s telecoms network cannot be changed overnight – it would be a 
multi-year, multi-billion pound project, at a time where we can least afford to undertake it. 
The UK set up the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre in 2010, under the purview of the National 
Cyber Security Centre to test Huawei’s components for security flaws. HCSEC has not, to date, found 
security flaws it believe stem from any Chinese Government interference. 
Nonetheless, it is critical for the Committee to note several points reported by HCSEC, since the 
Government’s position and justification of its decision was heavily based on the premise that security 
risks “can be managed” given the restrictions proposed.18 
In contrast, the HCSEC’s most recent (2019) annual report19 states 
1. HCSEC has consistently stated through its oversight board reports that the board can “provide 
only limited assurance that the long-term security risks can be managed in the Huawei 
equipment currently deployed in the UK” (emphasis from original report) – if such little 
assurance can be provided for currently deployed equipment, the Committee should question 
why Government is so confident it can manage the security risks its own advisors highlight. 
 
2. HCSEC has highlighted much of Huawei’s software “lacks basic engineering competence” and 
“significantly increased risk to UK operators”, and that some of their coding practices make the 
“job of any code auditor exceptionally hard”, and could be explained by “developers… actively 
working to hide bad coding practice rather than fix it”.  
 
3. HCSEC’s board has warned “it will be difficult to appropriate risk-manage future products… 
until the underlying defects in Huawei’s software engineering and cyber security processes are 
remediated…”(emphasis from original report), and that the board “has not yet seen anything to 
 
16 Joe Curtis. “Government's Huawei 5G cap will cost BT £500m”. City AM. 30 January 2020. 
https://www.cityam.com/bt-profit-falls-as-telecoms-giant-blames-regulation-costs/ 
17 BT delays removal of Huawei from EE's core network by two years. BBC News. 15th April 2020. 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-52296666  
18 https://www.ft.com/content/5bef8972-405a-11ea-bdb5-169ba7be433d 
19 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/790270/HCS
EC_OversightBoardReport-2019.pdf 
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give it confidence in Huawei’s capacity to successfully complete … its transformation program 
that it has proposed as a means of addressing these underlying defects.” 
These, and many other key points from the report, should be brought to the Committee’s attention, 
since much of the assurance the Government appears to be basing its decision on does not match with 
HCSEC’s own board’s reporting. These findings are technically very significant, as they highlight the 
challenges in providing assurance, and perceived likelihood of being able to get this assurance in the 
future. Assurance which Government is basing its decision on. This makes it seem doubtful that the 
Government’s approach was based on technical evidence, at least based on that available from HCSEC. 
Professor Steve Tasng, director of the China Institute at SOAS University of London believes the threat 
comes in from software updates, with “constantly updating code making it harder to maintain complete 
oversight”, and the level of risk being changeable, and therefore no longer manageable a few years 
down the line.20 
Terry Dunlap, a former NSA hacker and co-founder on cybersecurity firm ReFirm Labs, sees an economic 
strategy as a concern here: “They get their foot in the door via the subsidized pricing and then continue 
to eat away at the incumbent… As a result, the eventual switching costs you would face from a non-
subsidized replacement option are huge. Slowly over time more and more pieces of communications 
gear will be replaced by Huawei gear… Your security is controlled by the vendor, who may or may not 
choose to fix certain vulnerabilities. I guess that can be said about any vendor — but not all vendors 
have their government as a business partner.”21 
 
 
20 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/technology/britain-huawei-5G.html 
21 https://breakingdefense.com/2020/01/huawei-not-ok-for-uk-intelligence-experts/ 
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How will the UK Government’s decision impact the UK’s geopolitical position? 
From an international influence perspective, the evidence suggests that the UK’s geopolitical position 
would not likely be impacted significantly, as the decision is relatively small compared with the impact of 
Brexit. The UK’s soft power influence may be impacted somewhat, however. 
Eric Sayers – senior adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security – believes the UK decision 
will influence other states’ decisions on Huawei amid American pressure22. Michael Rogers, former 
Congressperson and chair of the House Intelligence Committee and now head of 5G Action Now, 
believes the US should now focus on Poland, Germany, and Canada to prevent them “from polluting 
their networks”23. 
According to the European Council on Foreign Relations, the UK has a lot of soft power24, as opposed to 
traditional military strength, but if the US and Australia were perceived to be less likely to pursue a free 
trade deal now due to Huawei decision, or use this to improve their negotiating position, and the UK 
was perceived to “lose” in the negotiations then this could present a negative impact on the UK’s 
prestige in international relations. Early indications indicated that US Vice President Mike Pence said 
that a Huawei deal could be a “deal-breaker” for a US/UK free trade agreement in February 202025. 
 
Although the decision does not directly impact the UK’s military capabilities, it could negatively impact 
UK’s geopolitical position by boosting the relative power of China in international politics, by reducing 
UK’s influence through dependence on a foreign state, threatening the western alliance system, and by 
undermining UKs soft power image. 
 
Huawei has won more 5G contracts than Nokia or Ericsson (over 90 contracts with mobile carriers in 
foreign countries so far)26, and by giving one of China’s largest telecoms company an even greater global 
market share in 5G supply, the UK’s decision may aid China’s rising influence in the global economy and 
boosts its relative power in international politics.  
Despite the UK’s long-term decline in conventional military capability over the past few decades, it is 
arguably still a major power in international politics with a nuclear deterrent, permanent seat in the UN 
security council, and top 10 military spender27. The UK is also a leader in cyber capability. 5G doesn’t 
affect these facts. Brexit will reduce UK’s influence, but again this is independent of Huawei and 5G. A 
country’s geopolitical influence comes also from its alliances and the 5G issue may threaten the Five 
Eyes alliance specifically – 3 of the five eyes nations (USA, Australia, New Zealand) have banned 
Huawei28, and the UK’s alliances are generally essential to presenting a unified and credible deterrent 
against threats – for example, the NATO alliance. 
 
22 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/technology/britain-huawei-5G.html 
23 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/technology/britain-huawei-5G.html 
24 https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_big_squeeze_british_foreign_policy_after_brexit 
25 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mike-pence-huawei-5g-boris-johnson-uk-trade-deal-us-
brexit-trump-latest-a9324086.html 
26 https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Huawei-claims-over-90-contracts-for-5G-leading-Ericsson 
27 https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_big_squeeze_british_foreign_policy_after_brexit 
28 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/03/04/uk-risks-plunging-five-eyes-alliance-crisis/ 
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On the other hand, however, Huawei’s access to the UK’s mobile networks potentially increases China’s 
political and economic leverage over the UK as well as posing the cyber espionage/warfare threats as 
explained earlier. 
 
It is worth the Committee considering how the UK’s soft power image comes from its dedication to 
democracy, human rights, and civil liberties29, and the UK government should consider whether it wants 
to be seen to be benefitting an authoritarian country with a divergent approach to western ideas of 
democracy, human rights and civil liberties. The UK came top in the world for soft power in the 2018 and 
2015 Portland Group, Comres & Facebook report30,31. The Committee should consider the impact on soft 
power and perceived strength if the UK is seen to not be able to provide and run its own 5G networks, at 
a time when 5G is increasingly important for nations. 
 
 
 
29 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-office-minister-talks-of-using-soft-power-in-the-interests-of-
the-uk 
30 https://comresglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Report_Final-published.pdf 
31 www.portland-communications.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-Soft-Power-30_press-release.pdf 
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How will the UK’s allies, particularly those in Five Eyes, respond to this decision? 
 
There has been significant press coverage over the how representatives of the US in particular have 
responded, both ahead of, and in response to, the UK decision.  
The US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, stated the Five Eyes network is strong, despite Britain’s 
decision [this week] to not exclude Huawei from providing 5G telecom equipment (Feb 2020)32, and that 
he was “very confident that our two nations will find a way to work together to resolve this 
difference”33. The US President’s acting chief of staff – Mick Mulvaney – told Oxford Union that a “direct 
and dramatic impact” on intelligence sharing will occur34. 
Former Speaker of the House, Newt Gringrich, called the decision a “major defeat” for the US; Senator 
Tom Cotton (R): equated the situation with allowing the KGB to build the UK telephone network during 
the Cold War; Senator Mark Warner (D) said he was “disappointed in UK’s decision…the United States 
remains committed to working with the UK and other key allies to build more diverse and secure 
telecommunications options that provide competitive alternatives to Huawei”35 
Senator Ben Sasse (R), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, took a very negative view, 
saying “Here’s the sad truth: Our special relationship is less special now that the U.K. has embraced the 
surveillance state commies at Huawei,” and that “The Chinese Communist Party has infected Five Eyes 
with Huawei, right at a time when the US and UK must be unified in order to meet the global security 
challenges of China’s resurgence.”36 
An anonymous Senate staffer was quoted by the Spectator as saying, “What our British friends need to 
remember is that it is ultimately the Senate, and not the President, who will decide whether a trade deal 
passes. A few frustrated Senators have the power to put major blocks on trade legislation.”37 For 
example, Senator Sasse is from Nebraska; a state that in 2016 had over $12 billion in receipts from 
livestock sales.38 A senator upset about 5G decisions may not want a trade deal with a country that will 
not accept his constituents’ beef or chicken. 
In letters sent from US Senators to the UK Prime Minister39, Rubio, Cotton and Cornyn said that: 
“Between 1998 and 2019, Huawei received more than $75 billion in subsidies, grants, land licenses, and 
other forms of financial assistance. Huawei has also routinely undercut its competitors’ prices, triggering 
anti-dumping investigations in the European Union and India. Last year, the Huawei 5G bid in the 
 
32 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-usa-huawei-pompeo/pompeo-backs-five-eyes-intelligence-sharing-
despite-uk-decision-on-huawei-idUSKBN1ZT1IV 
33 https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/30/pompeo-plays-down-rift-with-britain-over-huawei.html 
34 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/02/19/huawei-decision-will-have-dramatic-impact-us-ability-share-
security/ 
35 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2020/jan/28/labour-says-government-claim-to-be-reversing-
beeching-rail-cuts-meaningless-live-news 
36 https://breakingdefense.com/2020/01/huawei-not-ok-for-uk-intelligence-experts/ 
37 https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/washington-is-furious-at-boris-s-huawei-bid 
38 https://agecon.unl.edu/cornhusker-economics/2018/livestock-production-value-economic-impact-nebraska 
39 https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/1/rubio-cotton-cornyn-urge-members-of-united-
kingdom-s-national-security-council-to-reject-huawei-in-5g-infrastructure 
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Netherlands was 60 percent less expensive than its nearest competitor, a difference which, according to 
industry experts, does not even cover the cost of parts. No one can compete with a company that has 
the Chinese government absorbing its losses. Ultimately, allowing Huawei to participate in the United 
Kingdom’s 5G infrastructure undermines the goals of supply chain diversity and providing the best 
options for the British people.” 
“The economic arguments in favour of Huawei fall apart when the costs of risk mitigation are included. 
Managing risk on 5G networks is more difficult than existing 3G and 4G networks, because the software 
integration between the equipment erodes, if not eliminates, the “core” versus “edge” distinction. 
Reviewing the code as it is updated is a monumental task. This cost never goes away, because each 
update will require another round of review. Moreover, there is a human cost to consider. Hiring and 
training the people to do this means that otherwise talented individuals, at the expense of U.K. 
taxpayers and consumers, will be working to make Huawei better rather than investing their time and 
energy in creating a new program, a new company, or new jobs for working towns in Britain.” 
Elsewhere in the five eyes alliance, Australia banned Chinese vendors from supplying technology to its 
5G networks in 2018. As of the 10th of March 2020, Huawei has stated it is not currently trying to reverse 
this 5G ban, and was “not trying to win that battle anytime soon” 40. 
Canada has yet to make a decision, but their military was reported in February 2020 to have told the 
Canadian Government they believe allowing Huawei a role in their 5G networks would threaten national 
security41. 
Dr John Hemmings – associate fellow at the Henry Jackson Society and associate professor at a US 
Department of Defense academic institute – sees diplomatic damage resulting from the UK’s decision 
between the US and Australia, with slightly less damage with Canada and New Zealand, as a result of the 
UK being perceived to treat this “as a solely Huawei-related problem, rather than a broader China 
issue”42. 
The UK’s allies in Europe have generally taken a broadly similar approach to the UK – the European 
Commission’s “toolbox”43 have been reported to be a “far cry from a hard ban”. The approach being 
recommended does not single out any country or company, but advises member-state governments to 
assess risks associated with vendors, taking into account factors such as headquarters location, 
surveillance rules the company is subject to, and whether it is able to challenge government requests for 
espionage through “democratic checks and balances”. These measures are reported to be “without a 
doubt, targeted at China and its vendors, Huawei and the smaller rival ZTE”44. 
 
40 https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2020/03/huawei-5g-australia/ 
41 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-10/military-wants-huawei-banned-from-5g-in-canada-
globe-says 
42 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/03/04/uk-risks-plunging-five-eyes-alliance-crisis/ 
43 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/cybersecurity-5g-networks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-
measures 
44 https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-eu-huawei-5g-china-cybersecurity-toolbox-explained/ 
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How will this decision impact the UK’s security and defence capabilities and the UK’s 
interoperability with allies? 
In the unlikely event of a land invasion of the UK, then there could be an impact on security and defense 
capabilities, although it is important to note that the UK’s public mobile networks are those being 
discussed, rather than the dedicated military communications networks. However, when acting 
internationally, the military uses other communications techniques which are not part of the regular 
public commercial telecoms networks. 
In terms of interoperability, future coalitions – particularly US and UK if not all of NATO – would need a 
compatible portable system that can be moved/relocated into areas of operation, and it would be 
important to ensure that these systems were interoperable across the coalition of allies, and not 
exposed to the kinds of concerns identified here. 
How important it is for the UK, separately or with allies, to maintain industrial capability 
in this field? 
It is incredibly important that the UK, both separately, as well as with its international allies, creates 
capability in this field. The phrase "creates” is specifically and deliberately used, as the UK has lost a lot 
of its historical industrial capability in telecoms. There are a number of challenges and barriers to this, 
including around the economics of achieving this: 
1. Addressing the off-shoring and out-sourcing of the operation of our networks 
There has been a significant drive to out-source key components of mobile networks, including to 
companies now deemed to be high-risk vendors. This creates the risk of a significant capability gap, 
especially where skilled personnel are transferred out of UK companies to foreign companies. The 
committee should look at the scenario where, in December 2018, O2’s network was unavailable for 
a period of around 23 hours, affecting over 25 million customers45. 
O2 had significant reliance on Ericsson, the vendor of their mobile network core. O2 did not have 
the capabilities in-house to resolve this issue independently. While Ofcom has made it clear that 
“outsourcing elements of a network to a third party does not excuse a network provider from its 
obligations”, and that Ofcom “expect all providers to reflect on the steps they are taking […] 
particularly where reliance is placed on third party suppliers”, this is an opportunity for the 
committee to take this further. 
Our fixed and mobile telecommunications networks are critical national infrastructure. Covid-19 has 
shown just how critical they are. Therefore, it is a matter of strategic importance to ensure we have 
the on-shore capabilities to build, maintain, operate, and innovate, on our own mobile networks. 
The UK has a long and proud history of innovations in telecoms, and there is a clear opportunity to 
export this knowledge and expertise to our allies and friends around the world. We should work 
collaboratively with them to ensure we have a diverse and competitive marketplace for supply of 
equipment, with diverse and flexible supply chains – centralised dependency, as we are seeing in 
some areas due to Covid-19, is a strategic weakness the UK and allies need to address urgently. 
 
45 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/175010/o2-network-outage-cceb.pdf 
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2. Encouraging and supporting innovation in new telecoms networks and services 
To grow and maintain industrial capability in this area, it will be necessary for such businesses to be 
able to gain domestic revenue and market-share. Entering an existing market as a new entrant is a 
challenge, especially given the current limited choice and lack of competition, combined with lack of 
vendor lock-in and lack of interoperability. But since the UK does not currently have significant 
industrial capability in this area (i.e. it has no design or manufacturing company specialising in 3GPP 
mobile radio technology), it will need to be grown. It is also unlikely that the UK can compete purely 
on price – with high costs and standards of living, compared with existing vendors which have 
outsourced their R&D capabilities46. Despite this, it is clearly of strategic importance for the UK to 
have sufficient domestic, internal capabilities to operate, innovate, and maintain its own telecoms 
networks. As these networks become increasingly complex (with the evolution of 5G), and critical to 
our way of life, it is unthinkable that we do not develop and grow our own domestic capabilities in 
this field. 
3. Creating an environment in the UK where the incentive structure around investment in mobile 
infrastructure is addressed, to facilitate more secure alternatives. 
A purely profit-focused and revenue-focused approach to building mobile networks will, absent 
direct and specific enforced regulation, always result in a drive to the cheapest infrastructure 
option – this maximises the potential for profit. DCMS has identified that there is a lack of 
commercial drivers to improving security in telecoms, as “consumers of telecoms services do not 
tend to place a high value on security compared to other factors such as cost and quality”47. 
Government’s HCSEC monitoring centre has highlighted the issues of systemic poor software 
development practices. Security comes at a cost, and absent Government intervention, will not be 
present in the cheapest available option. 
One reason for this is because security aspects are inherently hidden from view – even outside of 
telecoms, users generally cannot see the security of the underlying infrastructure. This means it is 
not a competitive driver, as users are not able to see the difference between a cheaper operator 
(using high-risk vendor equipment) and a more expensive operator (perhaps using more expensive 
European or American equipment that has had extra money spent on security during development). 
If the UK’s cyber capability is considered akin to how growing of traditional military capability is viewed, 
then there are important lessons which can be learned from the previous experience in the sourcing, 
procurement and production of military hardware. For example, the British Nimrod maritime patrol 
aircraft replacement programme ran over budget by £800m (as many weapons systems programs do), 
then cost a further £200m to cancel. Between this occurring in 2010 and roll out of the new Poseidon 
aircraft in 2020, the UK had to borrow aircraft from allies including the US, Germany, France, Norway, 
and Canada.48 The important difference is if a 5G network is compromised due to working with 
Huawei, a network cannot be borrowed from allies. 
 
46 https://berthub.eu/articles/posts/5g-elephant-in-the-room/ 
47https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/819469/CC
S001_CCS0719559014-001_Telecoms_Security_and_Resilience_Accessible.pdf 
48 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-russia-submarines-patrol-planes-nimrod-poseidon-
p8-nato-monitor-activity-navy-air-force-security-a8151931.html 
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Thorsten Benner, director of the Global Public Policy Institute, believes makes UK vulnerable to 
espionage, sabotage, and blackmail49. Blackmail in the arms trade is often referred to as “dependency”, 
where overreliance on a single or a few suppliers can lead to the exporter attempting to exert influence 
over importers to receive maintenance/spare parts/ordnance.  As a major arms supplier, the UK is 
traditionally in position to exert leverage, not be subject to it – a potential major role reversal. 
A German security briefing believes they should avoid “monocultures” by relying on one or few 
suppliers, others recommend that Germany/EU should develop companies to build a 5G system that is 
internationally marketable50. This is broadly in line with the UK’s own objectives around diversifying the 
supply chain, but the current Government strategy does not appear to enable this, or recognise the 
issues of allowing approving the involvement of a heavily51 state-supported52 international provider to 
participate as a provider, while simultaneously expecting new entrants to emerge. 
There is clearly opportunity for the UK to partner with willing allies around diversification of the supply 
chain, with aligned interests, but care should be taken to ensure that the UK would itself be able to 
export and sell this technology on an international stage, along with its allies, rather than merely be a 
passive participant unable to exploit the work – this is a concern often seen in defence projects, where 
vetoes on export rights are held by multiple countries involved in R&D and component provision. 
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49 https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/31/boris-johnson-britain-knows-its-selling-out-its-national-security-to-
huawei/ 
50 Germany’s CDU stops short of Huawei ban in 5G rollout. February 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/e17ba42a-
4ce1-11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5 
51 https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-journal-calculated-huaweis-state-support-11577280830 
52 Huawei looks to state-backed vendor financing. April 2009, https://www.ft.com/content/3f1fd67e-2f56-11de-
a8f6-00144feabdc0 
